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Abstract 
This paper investigates the little-known reception of Thomas Hobbes, Henry More, Francis 
Bacon, Robert Boyle, Isaac Newton, and John Locke in the Scottish universities in the period 
1660–1700. 
The fortune of the English philosophers in the Scottish universities rested on whether their 
philosophies were consonant with the Scots’ own philosophical agenda. Within the 
established Cartesian curriculum, the Scottish regents eagerly taught what they thought best 
in English philosophy (natural philosophy and experimentalism) and criticised what they 
thought wrong (materialism, contractualism, anti-innatism). 
The paper also suggests new sources and perspectives for the broader discussion of the 
‘origins’ of the Scottish Enlightenment. 
  
Gellera: English Philosophers 
JSP 2015 
2 
 
ENGLISH PHILOSOPHERS AND SCOTTISH ACADEMIC 
PHILOSOPHY (1660-1700)1 
 
 
The Anglo-Scottish relations during the “long seventeenth century” are intensely studied 
by intellectual historians: the political, social, economical, and military events of the period 
laid the foundations for later British history.2 The same is true for the history of British 
philosophy, but relatively little research has been done on the relations between English and 
Scottish philosophy in the seventeenth century. The reason is well known: until very recently, 
the consensus was that nothing of specific philosophical interest happened in Scotland in the 
seventeenth century, with the exception perhaps of the diaspora of intellectuals and students 
to the United Provinces and England. Some notoriously went as far as saying that “Scotland 
spent most of the century under a calvinist gloom, which allowed little if anything in the way 
of new ideas”, and that “the universities were the unreformed seminaries of a fanatical 
clergy”.3 Research has focused almost exclusively on the relations between seventeenth-
century English philosophy and eighteenth-century Scottish philosophy. 
There is much to say for a better investigation of the relations between seventeenth-
century Scottish and English philosophy. The seventeenth-century Scottish philosophers were 
next-door neighbours of the great English philosophers of the time, as well as the direct 
predecessors of that unique philosophical blossoming that is the Scottish Enlightenment. It is 
reasonable to expect that these relations were more than a matter of geographical and 
temporal proximity. Recent research has confirmed that seventeenth-century Scottish 
philosophy has much to offer to historians of philosophy and intellectual historians alike.4 
Mainly the work of university teachers ‒ with a handful of notable non-academic 
philosophers ‒ seventeenth-century Scottish philosophy was rooted in Reformed 
scholasticism and lively enough to appropriate the philosophical novelties of France, the 
United Provinces, and England. 
 
1 I thank the following audiences for their helpful comments [omitted for blind review] 
2 For example, see the recent S. Adams and J. Goodare (eds), Scotland in the Age of Two Revolutions 
(Woodbridge ‒ Rochester [NY]: Boydell & Brewer, 2014. 
3 This is the equally famous and wrong opinion of H. R. Trevor-Roper cited in C. M. Shepherd, “Newtonianism 
in Scottish Universities in the Seventeenth Century”, in R. H. Campbell and A. Skinner, The Origins and Nature 
of the Scottish Enlightenment (Edinburgh: 1982), 65-85, 65. 
4 The best accounts to date are A. Broadie, A History of Scottish Philosophy (Edinburgh: 2009) and S. Hutton, 
British Philosophy in the Seventeenth Century (Oxford: 2015). 
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This investigation is not inconsequential for the vexed question of the “origins” of the 
Scottish Enlightenment. The terms of the debate are well known to the reader, so an 
introductory remark will suffice. The “continuist” view sees the origins of the Scottish 
Enlightenment in some pre-existing aspects of Scottish philosophy. The “non-continuist” 
view holds that the Scottish Enlightenment owes much (if not all) to philosophical 
developments elsewhere: England and the United Provinces are the best candidates for such 
an influence. No one, I believe, holds either position without a measure of nuances and 
qualifications. It is reasonable to believe that both aspects concurred to the Scottish 
Enlightenment. On the one side, Scottish philosophy was crucially influenced by English and 
Dutch philosophy, and by the intellectual network of the Republic of Letters. On the other 
side, even the best of influences falls dead without a proper receptive milieu. The Scottish 
Enlightenment could happen also because of the high-quality pre-existing philosophical 
tradition of seventeenth-century Scottish philosophy. 
This paper surveys the reception of the major English philosophers in the philosophy 
teaching of the Scottish universities in the second half of the seventeenth century. The aim is 
to provide textual evidence and contextualisation as an invitation for further research. I will 
treat, in rough chronological order, Thomas Hobbes, Henry More, Robert Boyle, Francis 
Bacon, Isaac Newton, and John Locke. Other philosophers greatly mattered, but these are 
arguably the most representative English philosophers of the century ‒ and the most 
represented in the Scottish universities. We will see how for some of them fame in England 
was matched by fame in Scotland, and how for others, in particular John Locke, this was not 
the case. I will argue that the fortune of the English philosophers rested on whether their 
respective philosophies were consonant with the Scottish universities’ own philosophical 
agenda. The Scottish regents taught what they thought best in English philosophy, criticised 
what they thought wrong, but ultimately discussed everything, more or less faithfully. The 
regents’ attitude seems one of active reception and relative open-mindedness ‒ with the 
exception of those doctrines tainted with atheism and materialism.5 
The reception of the English philosophers is thus a filter and a vantage point to investigate 
the regents’ philosophy teaching and intellectual agenda. Natural philosophical interests tend 
to dominate the curriculum ‒ as well as this paper ‒ and dictate the regents’ reading list of 
English philosophers. The universities are uniquely representative of (seventeenth-century) 
Scottish philosophy. Contrary to elsewhere in Europe, such as England and France, a great 
 
5 For example, it is quickly conceded that the regents exercised their polemical wit rather than their critical 
acumen when reading Thomas Hobbes or Baruch Spinoza. 
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deal of the philosophical production came out of university teaching although notable non-
academic philosophers were active in the period.6 A final preliminary remark concerns the 
scope and temporal limits of my sources. I have privileged the graduation theses, usually 
titled Theses philosophicæ, because they are official university publications, bear the name of 
the regent who authored them, and present the most salient parts of the philosophy 
curriculum. Other sources are worth investigating for a full depiction of philosophy teaching, 
such as the library holdings and the occasionally undecipherable students’ notes. Regarding 
the temporal limits: after 1660 are the attempts to reform the scholastic curriculum which 
gradually produced a “Cartesian” curriculum until the 1690s. The choice of the year 1700 
suffers from a degree of arbitrariness but I take it to represent a turning point in the history of 
Scottish philosophy teaching, right before natural law, Newtonianism, the gradual end of the 
regenting system and of Latin as the philosophical language, and the first signs of the 
Enlightenment. 
 
1. The Background: Reformed Scholasticism and Cartesianism 
The citations of the English philosophers are second only to those of René Descartes and 
Aristotle. Aristotle is at once a polemical target and an authority: he is criticised as the old 
way of doing philosophy but praised in logic and moral philosophy. It is Descartes who had 
the strongest impact on the curriculum after 1670.7 Between around 1670 and 1700 the 
regents taught a philosophy curriculum inspired to Descartes in an original way. Two 
elements are important: 1) the regents produced a synthesis of Reformed scholasticism and 
Cartesianism. On both a principled and doctrinal level, the transition from scholasticism to 
Cartesianism does not cause the frictions, debates, and condemnations of Cartesianism seen 
elsewhere. Cartesianism was appealing to the regents because of its pedagogical value (a 
system which could compare to scholasticism),8 and because of some doctrines: the 
 
6 James Dalrymple, First Viscount Stair, author of the Physiologia Nova Experimentalis (Leiden: 1686). James 
Dundas, First lord Arniston, can now be acknowledged as a philosopher in light of the recent discovery of the 
manuscript of the Idea Philosophiæ Moralis (1679). Alexander Broadie and I are under contract with Edinburgh 
University Press for the critical edition and translation of the Idea. Pertinent to this paper is A. Broadie, “James 
Dundas on the Hobbesian State of Nature”, Journal of Scottish Philosophy 11 (2013), 1-13. Finally, Dundas’ 
neighbour, George Mackenzie, author of the Religio Stoici (1663). 
7 C. M. Shepherd, Philosophy and Science in the Arts Curriculum of the Scottish Universities in the 17th century. 
PhD diss. (University of Edinburgh: 1975): passim. For example p. 337 for the comparison of Scotland and the 
United Provinces; Hutton 2015, chapter 2; G. Gellera, “The reception of Descartes in the seventeenth-century 
Scottish universities: metaphysics and natural philosophy (1650-1680)”, Journal of Scottish Philosophy 13 
(2015), 179-201; A. Raffe, “Intellectual change before the Enlightenment: Scotland, the Netherlands and the 
reception of Cartesian thought, 1650-1700”, Scottish Historical Review, 94 (2015), 24-47. 
8 John Henry, The Reception of Cartesianism, in Peter R. Anstey (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of British 
Philosophy in the Seventeenth Century (Oxford, 2013), 117 and 136. 
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Reformed strand of scholasticism of the Scottish universities anticipated some of Descartes’ 
own views because of a common inclination towards Scotism.9 2) The reception of Descartes 
was not a mere repetition. Some views are reinterpreted by the regents in an original way, 
which suggests that they did not give up on some principles of scholastic philosophy they 
deemed fundamental.10 
The resulting picture is a synthesis of Reformed scholasticism and Cartesianism. 
Distinctive features are: a fundamental empiricism in epistemology (trust in the senses, direct 
realism), a Christian substance dualism (metaphysics studies the spirits, natural philosophy 
studies the natural bodies), reductionism in the theory of substance (the accidents are modes 
of the substances), a foundationalist structure of knowledge. With this background in mind 
we can investigate the reception of the English philosophers. 
 
2. Thomas Hobbes 
Thomas Hobbes is the archetypical polemical target of the Scottish regents. He is the 
single most cited English philosophers, overwhelmingly in a negative way. He is, in turns, 
“ineptus”,11 “fumivendulus”. “monophagus”,12 “delirans”,13 “crassissimus”,14 cursed,15 on a 
par with Vaninus and Spinoza,16 “horrendus”.17 These epithets are not really surprising, 
considering Hobbes’ reputation as an atheist throughout the seventeenth century. In the mind 
of the regents, Hobbes’ atheism came from his materialism: they reacted from a Christian 
perspective to the views of the materiality of the soul, and to the negation of the existence of 
spirits and substantial forms in metaphysics and natural philosophy. The regents draw from a 
number of Hobbes’ texts, mainly the Leviathan for his political and moral thought and the De 
corpore for his natural philosophy. Many Hobbes citations are in Hamilton’s theses (1668) 
and Alexander’s theses (1669). The latter are particularly interesting because Hobbes is 
criticised for his nominalism in logic, for the views that truth is a property of propositions and 
 
9 R. Ariew, Descartes and the Last Scholastics (Ithaca – London: 1999), 55: “Descartes leans toward Scotism 
for every one of the Scotist theses, as long as they are relevant to his philosophy.” 
10 [omitted for blind review] 
11 R. Hamilton, Schediasmata Libero-Philosophica (Edinburgh: 1668, St Salvator’s College), I. 
12 A. Alexander, Philosophemata Libera (Aberdeen: 1669, Marischal College), Ethical Theses III, Physical 
theses II. 
13 H. Scougal, Positiones hasce Philosophicas (Aberdeen: 1673, King’s College), VII-VIII: against 
contractualism and relativism. 
14 G. Middleton, Theses philosophicæ (Aberdeen: 1675, King’s College), XXVI, for Hobbes’ negation of spirits. 
15 J. Buchan, Theses Philosophicæ (Aberdeen: 1681, King’s College), XXX: against the view that ratiocinatio is 
a conventional association of words. 
16 T. Burnet, Theses Philosophicæ (Aberdeen: 1686, Marischal College), II, because of his atheism. 
17 G. Peacock, Theses Philosophicæ (Aberdeen: 1697, Marischal College), V. On the negation of the 
immortality of the soul. 
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not of substances, and that thinking is grounded on speech.18 Again, not surprisingly, Hobbes 
is criticised for being a contractualist in moral and political philosophy, which leads to 
relativism and the negation of God’s rational nature.19 
Hobbes political philosophy faces heavy criticism. The Scottish universities were, prima 
facie, potentially sympathetic with Hobbes’ theory of the state. In opposition to the overall 
narrative of a limited monarchy tradition in Scotland,20 the regents always defend the 
absolute power of the king deriving from the sole divine authority.21 They seem to be 
oblivious here of John Duns Scotus, whom they otherwise often cite favourably.22 Another 
proponent of limited representative monarchy, the Humanist George Buchanan, is strongly 
attacked in the theses by James Martin (1681) in the only reference to him in the seventeenth-
century theses.23 In general, the regents very rarely engage with political themes. Before the 
introduction of natural law by Gershom Carmichael in the late 1690s, political philosophy has 
a very minor role in the theses, and is more conservative and scholastic than the other 
disciplines.24 
The Exclusion Crisis (1679-1681) might have motivated more open positions in the early 
1680s. The theses by regents James Martin and John Buchan, both from 1681 and from the 
two Aberdeen colleges Marischal and King’s respectively, have strong political tones. 
Hobbes is (even!) accused of being a revolutionary, for his view that a subject can revolt 
against the sovereign in order to preserve his life.25 In Martin’s theses, paragraph XIII is a 
defence of the God-sanctioned royal succession, which cannot be changed by men. In 
Buchan’s theses, the conclusive paragraphs LXXVIII to LXXXVI attack Hobbes on the 
origin of good and evil, on the view that kings are bound by natural law, and on the 
 
18 Alexander 1669, Logical Theses. 
19 Buchan 1681, LXXXIX. 
20 K. Bowie, “‘A legal limited monarchy’: Scottish constitutionalism in the Union of Crowns, 1603‒1707”, 
Journal of Scottish Historical Studies 35 (2015), 131-154. 
21 For example: J. Martin, Positiones Philosophicæ (Edinburgh: 1681, Marischal College), Ethico-Political 
Theses X, where King Charles is called a “martyr”; and Burnet 1686, IV where James VIII is called 
“absolutissimus Monarcha Scotiæ.” 
22Broadie 2009, 25-31 for the origins of Scottish contractualism in Scotus. 
23 Martin 1681: the whole Ethico-Political section is an attack of Buchanan’s contractualism and limited 
monarchy. 
24 Ronald G. Cant has argued that after the Stewart restoration in 1660 the traditional religious and political 
control over the universities focused more on political conservatism than religious orthodoxy. This might have 
contributed to the expansion of “whole areas of investigation in which considerations of civil and ecclesiastical 
polity simply did not arise”, such as mathematics and natural philosophy. “Origins of the Enlightenment in 
Scotland; the Universities”, in R. H. Campbell and A. Skinner, The Origins and Nature of the Scottish 
Enlightenment (Edinburgh: 1982), 42-63, 43. 
25 Buchan 1681, LXXIX. See Broadie 2013, 3 on a similar criticism moved by James Dundas to Hobbes: “the 
chief point in natural law is not what Hobbes thinks it is, that each person has a right to use all ways and means 
to preserve himself.” 
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aforementioned dangerous principle that a citizen can revolt to defend their life, forbidden by 
the Bible. Finally, paragraph LXXXVI explicitly takes the “Tory” side in the Exclusion 
Crisis: the Stuart succession is above positive law, royal authority does not reside in the 
people who cannot limit or transfer it. Indeed, “potentissimus erit populus: sed in suam 
ruinam.” Arguably, the tragedy of the civil war still loomed in the minds of the regents, and 
translated into the defence of absolute monarchy for fear of political instability. The 
conservative Aberdeen publicly sided with the king in the Exclusion Crisis in the persons of 
Martin and Buchan. Though it might be fitting for a regent teaching at “King’s College”, 
such a rare (in the theses) political statement had clear Catholic and pro-absolute monarchy 
connotations. 
 
3. Henry More 
Henry More and the Cambridge Platonists have recently seen their relations with the 
Scottish Enlightenment re-evaluated.26 The Scottish regents show a constant interest in Henry 
More from the 1670s on. More (and Boyle) is the “Christian and modern” philosopher par 
excellence. Such credentials are based on his defence of the spirits and immaterial principles 
within the new metaphysics inaugurated by Descartes: namely, substance dualism. Henry 
More “moderates” the potential excesses of Cartesianism: a mechanistic understanding of the 
universe potentially dismissive of God’s role, and a reductionist metaphysics with all 
substances (not only corporeal ones) being nothing more than modifications of matter ‒ so to 
speak, a Hobbesian interpretation of Descartes. 
More is acknowledged as an authority in moral philosophy, especially in the theory of the 
passions. In pre-natural law philosophy teaching, the theory of the passions was influenced 
by Descartes’ moral philosophy. There are passages from the graduation theses which are 
very close citations of More’s Enchyridion Ethicum.27 In addition to this text, the regents 
studied the correspondence between Descartes and More, first published in 1662.28 Although 
More’s sentimentalist views are only rarely mentioned,29 More’s later importance in the 
Scottish Enlightenment can be seen through his continuous presence in university teaching. 
 
26 M. B. Gill, “From Cambridge Platonism to Scottish Sentimentalism”, Journal of Scottish Philosophy 8 
(2010), 13-31; S. Hutton, “From Cudworth to Hume: Cambridge Platonism and the Scottish Enlightenment”, 
Canadian Journal of Philosophy 42 (2012), 8-26. 
27 For example: Middleton 1675, XLV on the definition of virtue. 
28 Hutton 2015, 65. 
29 Hamilton 1668, Ethical Theses I on happiness, boniform faculty, and self-love. 
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A similar, yet much minor, role in the theses plays Ralph Cudworth. In 1684 Cudworth’s 
defence of spirits in physics is invoked by regent Robert Forbes in his attack against 
Descartes supposed “materialism”.30 
 
4. The “Experimentalists”: Robert Boyle, Francis Bacon, and Isaac Newton 
Among the English philosophers, the “experimentalists” are, collectively, the most cited 
ones. They alone represent around half of the total citations in the graduation theses, with the 
exception of Aristotle and Descartes. There is evidence that the experimentalists are systemic 
in the philosophy teaching, far more than Henry More is. 
Treating philosophers so diverse as Bacon, Boyle, and Newton under the same heading 
requires an explanation. The expression “experimentalists” helps pick out the fact that, 
according to the regents, these thinkers contributed to the same narrative: that the new 
physics, and experimentalism above all, is the best theory of the physical world because it 
improves and expands Descartes’ notion of res extensa, and provides a better natural 
theology. The (scholastic) distinction here is between general physics and special physics. 
The former deals with the general principles of bodies: here, Descartes’ is unsurpassed, in 
that he provides a Christian metaphysics of the physical world, and a clear distinction 
between the immaterial and material worlds. Special physics deals with the specific 
properties of the bodies: here Descartes (for example: on the vortex theory, inertia, light, and 
colour) is improved or surpassed by the English experimentalists. Additionally, this 
enthusiasm for the experimentalists signals a fundamental optimism about the present state 
and future of philosophy. The regents recurrently celebrate “hujus sæculi genius” for setting 
philosophy and the knowledge of the external world on a successful course, and the “Felix 
philosophiæ incrementum”.31 Almost absent are the criticisms of the new philosophy, 
especially Cartesianism, in the name of allegiance to scholasticism, Aristotle, or the true 
religion, which were very common elsewhere in Europe. The opposition to Descartes, though 
present and lively especially in the Presbyterian circles, was much less visible in the 
Episcopalian-controlled universities.32 The fortune of Descartes and of the English 
experimentalists is quite interesting also because it suggests a perhaps unexpected open-
mindedness of the Scottish regents. 
 
30 R. Forbes, Theses Philosophicæ (Aberdeen: 1684, King’s College), IX. 
31 Buchan 1681, LXXVI. 
32 Raffe, “Intellectual change before the Enlightenment”, 26; and G. Gellera, “The Philosophy of Robert Forbes: 
a Scottish Scholastic Response to Cartesianism” Journal of Scottish Philosophy 11.2 (2013): 191-211. 
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The new physics as it is understood by the Scottish regents is a mixture of old and new. It 
is not a deductive, a priori discipline, as in scholasticism, yet it still is about the knowledge of 
the essence of things. It is not a full experimentalist discipline either, though the praises of 
experientia are recurrent. It is not dependent from metaphysics in the way scholastic natural 
philosophy was; rather, it is dependent from metaphysics because coherence with the 
Cartesian metaphysics of substance dualism is a requisite. It is, in good English experimental 
spirit, increasingly understood as a natural or physico-theology which replaces the traditional 
metaphysical proofs of the existence of God.33 Neither is it a mathematical theory of the 
natural bodies: the regents lacked the adequate mathematical background. There is still a 
clear qualitative aspect in the understanding of the natural phenomena as dependent on the 
essence of matter, although this essence is solely explained in terms of modifications and 
movement according to the new science. 
Bacon, Boyle, and Newton represent, respectively, different aspects of the new science. I 
treat them in order of their importance in the graduation theses. 
 
Robert Boyle 
Robert Boyle is second only to Descartes in the consideration of the regents. His praises 
are as numerous as are Hobbes’ epithets. Boyle is, with Rohault, the “Castor and Pollux” of 
modern science and “naturæ peritissimus”,34 “Anglorum ingenium” and a “præponderans 
authoritas”,35 “gentis et sæculi ornamentum”,36 “Regiæ Societatis ornamentum”,37 
“eximius”.38 What is the specific merit of Boyle? A passage of John Buchan’s theses (1681) 
answers the question: 
The most knowledgeable and most ingenious Robert Boyle, in his treatise On 
Forms, and Qualities, presents a short but exact summary of mechanical 
philosophy. He states that, first, the matter of all bodies is the same, namely an 
extended and impenetrable substance. Secondly, that movement does not belong 
 
33 Chairs of Mathematics were established at the Scottish universities in the second half of the century. Notable 
professors were James Gregory at St Andrews and Edinburgh and the anti-Cartesian George Sinclair at 
Glasgow, whose Chair included ‘experimental philosophy’. Despite this, the academic connection between 
mathematics and natural philosophy was rarely there until the Newtonianism combined them towards the end of 
the century. On the emergence of physico-theology: Peter Harrison, “Physico-Theology and the Mixed 
Sciences: The Role of Theology in Early Modern Natural Philosophy,” in Peter R. Anstey and John A. Schuster 
(eds), The Science of Nature in the Seventeenth Century. Patterns of Change in Early Modern Natural 
Philosophy (Dordrecht: 2005), 165-184. 
34 Hamilton 1668, Logical Theses, V; Physical Theses, VII. 
35 Alexander 1669, Physical Theses, I and III. 
36 Scougal 1673, XIV. 
37 A. Massie, Theses Philosophicæ (Edinburgh: 1687, University of Edinburgh), XI. 
38 G. Skene, Decermina haec Philosophica (Aberdeen: 1696, King’s College), IX. 
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to the essence of matter, neither is it produced by the accidents of matter; rather, it 
is matter’s first and particular mode. Thirdly, that the differences between bodies 
are explained by their accidents. Fourthly, that the various determinations of 
movement naturally divide matter into different parts [...].39 
Buchan lists eight doctrines characteristic of mechanical philosophy which are most aptly 
expressed by Boyle. This consideration of Boyle as a systematiser of mechanical philosophy 
is perhaps surprising, considering Boyle’s own “reluctance to systematize”.40 I believe that 
Buchan is not so much interested in understanding Boyle’s approach to science; rather in 
what Boyle’s role in the philosophy curriculum of the universities could be. Hence, the On 
the Origins of Forms and Qualities represents the best introduction to mechanical philosophy 
available, of great pedagogical value to students. As for the reception of Henry More, another 
crucial aspect is Boyle’s theology: the Christian interpretation of the new science and its 
capacity to replace metaphysics as a natural theology is a central concern in the regents’ 
philosophy.41 
 
Francis Bacon 
Francis Bacon is a relatively late entry in the bibliography of the graduation theses. Before 
the 1680s there is only one reference to Bacon in Hamilton’s theses (1668), albeit a very 
important one: 
As Bacon says, our intellect invite for the help of the things in order to perfect its 
own thinking.42 
Bacon’s method is directed towards the investigation of the external things, which are the 
high way to improve our knowledge and intellect. Hamilton is celebrating the empirical 
method, with the implicit criticism of the overly speculative approach to natural philosophy 
typical of the scholastics and of the Cartesian alike. By the end of the 1680s, more regents 
 
39 Buchan 1681, XXXVI: “Brevem, sed exactam Philosophiæ mechanicæ summam, exhibet eruditissimus & 
maxime ingeniosus Philosophus D. Rob. Boyl, in tractatu suo de Formis, & Qualitatibus, observando, Primo, 
omnium corporum materiam esse eandem, substantiam sciz. extensam & impenetrabilem. Secundo, motum 
neque esse essentiam materiæ, neque ab aliis accidentibus produci; sed esse illius primum et præcipuum 
modum. Tertio, diversitatem inter corpora ab eorum accidentibus ortum ducere. Quarto, motum varie 
determinatum, naturaliter dividere materiam in partes [...].” All translations are my own. Skene 1696, IX 
likewise claims that Boyle provides the best summa of mechanical philosophy. 
40 Hutton 2015, 173. 
41 For example, Alexander 1669, Physical theses, IV, celebrates Boyle’s experimental philosophy which 
contemplates and concatenates the natural phenomena as a natural theology, and opposes it to Hobbes’ 
materialistic Natura naturans; and Metaphysical theses, III: “Rob; Boyl: & Henrici Mori, qui non sine successu, 
naturalem DEI cognitionem manifeste elucubrant.” 
42 Hamilton 1668, V: “Ut loquitur F. B. Verul. Intellectus noster accersit auxilia a rebus ad perficiendam sui 
cogitationem.” 
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identify Francis Bacon as the master of philosophical method, a title previously held by 
Descartes. Whereas Keith’s theses of 1687 mention only Descartes in the discussion of the 
præjudicia infantiæ (a topos of Bacon’s philosophy), Peacock in 1689 reverses the narrative: 
The most famous Descartes was much guided by the light of this founder of arts 
and sciences [Francis Bacon]. Descartes, who ushered in a new logic, under the 
name of metaphysics or meditations, imitated Bacon to the point of creating a 
new philosophy from its foundations. He wanted to depose all prejudices, and 
decided to build all the rest using a firm principle as a basis, once he found one. 
Anyway, he did not follow the same path as Bacon: whereas Bacon looked for the 
help of the external things in order to improve the intellect, Descartes claimed 
that there is enough help in our thinking that the mind can, by its own strength, 
get to know all things.43 
According to Peacock, Descartes has imitated Bacon in the philosophical method, although 
he has diverted from Bacon’s original point. Descartes’ rationalism brought him to rely on 
the sole mind in the quest for truth, whereas Bacon directed the mind towards the external 
things ‒ making the same point as regent Hamilton (1668). This latter remark encapsulates a 
fundamental and original revision of Descartes in Scottish Cartesianism: empiricism takes the 
place of rationalism as the foundation of knowledge.44 Bacon perfectly embodies this 
approach, although it is plausible that, after all, Bacon’s role in the theses does not go much 
further than a general nominal praise. Later, in the theses of 1693, Peacock mentions Bacon’s 
method as “inductive”.45 In the same theses, Peacock presents the triad of the new 
philosophy: 
We rejoice in the genius of the present century, which rejected the Epicurean, the 
Vain and overly celebrated principles of the Chemists, Salt, Sulphur, and 
Mercury, as well as the Substantial Forms and Prime Matter of the Peripatetics. 
Our century with the Noble Bacon, Descartes, and Boyle laid out the genuine 
foundations of Philosophy, and stated the true principles of the natural bodies, 
 
43 G. Peacock, Theses Philosophicæ (Aberdeen: 1689, Marischal College), I: “Ab hoc artium & scientiarum 
instauratore, multum lucis fœveratus est Claris. Cart. qui logicam quandam novam, sub Metaphysicæ vel 
meditationum nomine invexit, Verulamium eatenus imitatus, quod novam Philosophiam a fundamentis 
excitaturus, seponere voluerit omnia præjudicia, & quodam principio firmo detecto, huic tanquam basi, reliquam 
superstuere molem decreverit: non eandem tamen viam quam Verulamius est ingressus cum enim ille auxilia a 
rebus ad perficiendum intellectum petierit, hic vero satis præsidii esse autumabat in ipsa cogitatione, ut mens 
possit vi sua, in omnium rerum cognitionem pervenire.” 
44 The earliest “empiricist” version of Cartesianism was given by the Utrecht physician Henricus Regius. There 
is no evidence that the regents’ interpretation of Descartes originated in Regius. See also Gellera, “The 
Reception of Descartes”, 190-191. 
45 G. Peacock, Theses Philosophicæ (Aberdeen: 1693, Marischal College), IV. 
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namely matter and movement, combined with magnitude or figure and the other 
dispositions of the bodies.46 
Perhaps to the reader’s surprise, Isaac Newton is not there. 
 
Isaac Newton 
We are accustomed to the view that in the early eighteenth century “Newtonianism” 
replaced the philosophy previously taught in the Scottish universities,47 and that most of the 
achievements of the Scottish Enlightenment can actually be regarded as different ways of 
applying the Newtonian method in philosophy, as David Hume famously said.48 Scotland had 
much to do with the early dissemination of Newtonianism, and Newton enjoyed a vast 
popularity in the eighteenth-century Scottish universities. The situation is rather different 
until the end of the seventeenth century.49 In this period, the Scottish mathematicians saw 
Newton’s greatness before the natural philosophers did.50 Newton is known by the regents as 
the author of an important experiment on light and colour as early as 1674,51 and his name is 
only linked to this specific debate (where his view is always preferred over Descartes’) and to 
his dismissal of the Cartesian vortices (his view is often preferred over Descartes’).52 The 
situation does not change with the publication of the Principia mathematica in 1687. Newton 
is a “mathematicus”: he is not credited with a novel philosophical method, or with any 
 
46 Peacock 1693, VI: “Gratulamur fœlici hujus ævi genio, quod rejectis Epicureorum Atomis & Inani ac 
decantatis Chymicorum principiis Sali, Sulphuro & Mercurio, Peripateticorum etiam Materia prima & Formis 
substantialibus cum Nob. Verul. Cart. Boylio &c. genuina jecerit Philosophiæ fundamina, & vera corporum 
naturalium statuminaverit principia, nempe materia, et motum, una cum magnitudine sive figura, aliisque 
corporum dispositionibus.” 
47 P. Wood, “Candide in Caledonia: the Culture of Science in the Scottish Universities”, 1690‒1805, in M. 
Feingold (ed.), Universities and Science in the Early Modern Period (Dordrecht: 2006), 182-199, 191; Hutton 
2015, 45; Raffe 2015, 26. 
48 D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: 1960), Introduction, xx: “ʼTis 
no astonishing reflection to consider, that the application of experimental philosophy to moral subjects should 
come after that to natural at the distance of above a whole century.” Although Hume’s own Newtonianism 
might be limited to few methodological remarks. 
49 For a survey of graduation theses and lecture notes: C. M. Shepherd, “Newtonianism in Scottish Universities 
in the Seventeenth Century”, in R. H. Campbell and A. Skinner, The Origins and Nature of the Scottish 
Enlightenment (Edinburgh: 1982), 65-85. 
50 In particular, the circles around the Gregory family, James and the two David. 
51 In 1674 Newton was known only for the article “New Theory of Light and Colours” published in 1672 in the 
Philosophical Transactions. A likely source of the early reception of Newton in St Andrews is the presence 
there of James Gregory, appointed to the Chair of Mathematics in 1668. Niccolò Guicciardini, ‘Gregory, James 
(1638–1675)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004 
[http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/11465, accessed 17 May 2016] 
52 For example, William Sanders, Theses Philosophicae (Glasgow, 1674, St Leonard’s College), XX; Alexander 
Cockburn, Theses philosophicæ (Edinburgh, 1675, St Leonard’s College), XXXII; Middleton 1675, XV; Martin 
1681, XI; Gilbert MacMurdo, Theses hasce Philosophicas (Edinburgh, 1682, University of Edinburgh), XVII; 
More 1691, XVIII; Peacock 1697, VIII. Newton dismisses the vortices: George Fraser, Positiones aliquot 
philosophicae (Aberdeen, 1691, King’s College), IX; Alexander Fraser, Determinationes philosophicae 
(Aberdeen, 1693, Marischal College), XIX. 
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importance in disciplines other than special physics and astronomy. What was arguably 
needed for a “philosophical Newton”, or a “Newton for the Faculties of Arts”, was something 
akin to George Turnbull’s intuition to develop the potentialities of “Newtonian method” and 
apply it to the whole of philosophy.53 
A glimpse of “Newtonian method” is in the introductory paragraph of Kennedy’s theses of 
1694. Under the suggestive heading “Demens qui voluit rerum cognoscere causas” ‒ at once 
gesturing at Newton’s rejection of essentialist talks and echoing at a distance Calvin’s distrust 
of the powers of the human faculties in the post-lapsarian state ‒ Kennedy claims that: 
Descartes gave us a hypothesis, that is, a Fable, not Philosophy. Newton showed 
us Philosophy, not a hypothesis. He is the one who laid down the first 
foundations of Philosophy, and the First one who carried up philosophy from the 
foundations to the heavens: those who ascribe to Newton only a hypothesis are 
plain wrong.54 
Kennedy praises here both the intension and extension of Newton’s philosophy: he mastered 
method because he laid out the foundations, and he obtained comprehensiveness because his 
theory embraces the terrestrial as well as the celestial world. In a quasi-anticipation of the 
famous “hypotheses non fingo”,55 Newton is, for the first and only time in the seventeenth-
century theses, alternative to Descartes with respect to the general theories of the natural 
world, and not only to particular theories in special physics. In Kennedy’s mind, Newton 
comes with a distinctive philosophy and a method, though admittedly this high praise is not 
really followed by a presentation of Newton’s views in the remainder of Kennedy’s theses. It 
is suggestive to think that Kennedy’s original view of Newton might have been influenced by 
the Newtonian circle around Alexander Pitcairne and David Gregory in Edinburgh.56 On 
 
53 Wood 2006, 190; Broadie 2009, 111: “The title page of Principles of Moral Philosophy [...] contains a 
quotation that Turnbull first uses in his graduation oration of 1723, from Sir Isaac Newton’s Opticks, bk. III: 
‘And if natural philosophy, in all its parts, by pursuing this method, shall at length be perfected, the bounds of 
moral philosophy will also be enlarged.’” 
54 R. Kennedy, Theses hasce Philosophicas (Edinburgh: 1694, University of Edinburgh), I: “Hypothesin, i.e. 
Fabulam, non Philosophiam dedit Cartesius: Philosophiam, non Hypothesin exhibuit Neutonus. Hic ille est qui 
prima Philosophiæ fundamenta jecit, ipsamque Primus a fundamentis in Cœlum evexit: Falluntur ergo qui 
Neutono Hypothesin attribuunt.” 
55 The reference is not a direct one, for Newton used the expression for the first time in the second edition of the 
Principia in 1713. Anstey argues that among the English philosophers “the Cartesian system is used as an 
example of a hypothetical system”, P. R. Anstey, “Experimental versus Speculative Philosophy,” in P. R. 
Anstey and J. A. Schuster (eds), The Science of Nature in the Seventeenth Century. Patterns of Change in Early 
Modern Natural Philosophy (Dordrecht: 2005), 215-242, 229. Kennedy’s incipit might hint at the “anti-
hypothesis” rhetoric of the English debates in the 1690s, to which Newton decisively contributed. 
“Hypothetical” (that is, not physical) was also the ontological status of mathematical accounts advanced by the 
Jesuits in order to keep natural philosophy and mathematics separate. 
56 A. Guerrini, “The Tory Newtonians: Gregory, Pitcairne, and Their Circle”, Journal of British Studies 25 
(1986), 288-311. 
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paragraph IV, Kennedy laments David Gregory’s departure for Oxford: “D. Gregorio olim 
noster nunc Oxoniensis.” 
By the end of the seventeenth century, Isaac Newton, always praised but somehow 
distantly referred to as “Cantabrigensis”, seems to be rising to the high rank he will occupy 
in the eighteenth century. Francis Bacon acquired in the 1680s the status of master of method, 
and rivalled Descartes. The main household name is Robert Boyle: he is the most celebrated 
among the experimentalists, he produced the most exact mechanical science, and he best 
represents the new natural theology based on experimental method. In the general framework 
of Scottish Cartesianism, it is still Boyle who produced the best theory of matter and 
movement. Arguably, this “Scottish Boylianism” of the regents of Arts would have been 
hardly recognised by Boyle himself. 
 
5. John Locke 
John Locke was immediately recognised by his own contemporaries as a great 
philosopher,57 so his relative absence from the graduation theses in the late seventeenth and 
early eighteenth century begs an explanation. The Scottish regents were quick to grasp the 
importance of Locke’s An Essay Concerning Human Understanding published in 1690, but 
they were unequivocal in dismissing it altogether as against their philosophy. Here and 
elsewhere, the agreement among the regents is quite remarkable, and really suggestive of the 
existence of a common curriculum across the Scottish universities, albeit not an officially 
sanctioned one. The de facto curriculum was rather based on the widespread adherence to 
Reformed scholastic and Cartesian themes. I believe that Locke’s fate in the Scottish 
universities was sealed by the impossibility to build a university curriculum on Locke’s 
philosophy, and by the incompatibility of some central Lockean views and the Scottish 
curriculum at the time. These factors combined explain the very minor role Locke plays in 
the theses.58 
Nonetheless, the only four references to Locke are very interesting. The first one is by 
Alexander More, in his 1691 theses: 
Since the idea of God is innate, that Englishman John Locke can be accused of 
falsity, who recently wrote in his book on the human intellect that the human 
 
57 Hutton 2015, 46. 
58 P. Wood, The Aberdeen Enlightenment: the Arts curriculum in the Eighteenth Century (Aberdeen: 1993), part 
1, argues for a more prominent role of Locke in the university teaching. So does Shepherd 1975, 339: “though 
the Cartesian method is recommended from the 1670s, and it in turn is superseded by Locke’s philosophy.” I 
have found no convincing evidence for these claims. 
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mind is a tabula rasa without any ideas, and that there are in it no innate 
principles speculative and practical.59 
The second and third ones are in the 1697 theses by John Loudon. In paragraph X Locke is 
criticised for favouring atheism too much with his philosophy (“Ut ad Atheismum facilius 
aperiatur via”, paragraph X) because, as a Deist, he rejects the infinite idea of God ‒ perhaps, 
the regent accepts the Cartesian notion of infinity and ascribes something like Gassendi’s 
notion to Locke. In paragraph XII, his rejection of innate ideas is again targeted: 
God exists, and his light, without any other arguments needed, seizes the mind 
and forces its assent. Hence, I cannot make sense of why John Locke fights 
against the Innate Ideas, by means of complicated sophistries, as if he were 
fighting with his own shadow.60 
The final reference is in the 1696 theses by Skene, paragraph II: there Locke is accused of 
maintaining the soul in an “ergastulo corporeo”, arguably in light of his scepticism about the 
immateriality of the soul and the view that matter can think. These regents believe that a 
version of strong innatism is the best account of the nature and presence in our mind of the 
idea of God. This position might well be an exaggeration of Descartes’ view influenced by 
the Calvinist sense of divinity. 
It is quite evident that the regents did not go much beyond Book I of the Essay, and that 
what they read there against the innate ideas was enough to dismiss the Anglus Locke. There 
might also be non-philosophical reasons which added more weight to the philosophical ones. 
As a member of the English Board of Trade, John Locke was heavily involved in the 
ultimately successful English manoeuvring against the Scottish colonial expedition at Darien. 
The linkage of Locke’s name to the dire consequences of the expedition would have 
overshadowed the brightest philosophical achievements of the Anglus Lockius. 
 
6. Non-English philosophers: Gassendi 
 
59 A. More, Theses Philosophicæ (Aberdeen: 1691, Marischal College), III: “Cum itaque innata sit hæc Dei idea, 
falsitatis merito sinsimulandus est nuperus quidam Anglus Ioan. Lock.  in lib. cui tit. humanus intellectus, in quo 
asserit mentem humanam esse tabulam rasam omnibus ideis vacuam, & in ea nulla esse principia innata 
speculativa vel practica.” The regent attributes the expression “tabula rasa” to Locke, who never used it in the 
Essay. The expression is common in the theses: as early as Alexander 1669, Logical Theses III, who celebrates 
Henry More for arguing that the mind is not a tabula rasa. 
60 J. Loudon, Theses Philosophicæ (Edinburgh: 1697, St Leonard’s College), XII: “Deus existit, ut luce sua, 
absque argumentis aliunde adductis, mentem in assensum rapiat. Unde nihil est reliquum cur, operosis adeo 
cavillationibus, quasi cum umbra sua luctaretur, [...] Innatas Ideas impugnet Jo. Lockius.” Later, G. Peacock 
Theses philosophicae (Aberdeen: 1711, Marischal College), V, reiterates the same point against Locke. 
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The analysis of the citations of non-English philosophers sheds further light on the 
importance of the English philosophers in Scottish philosophy teaching. For reasons of space 
I can only make a very general remark. The most cited non-English philosopher is the French 
Pierre Gassendi,61 followed by the Dutch Adriaan Heereboord ‒ second only to Descartes. 
They are cited, respectively, as many times as Boyle and Bacon. Gassendi is cited six times 
in Hamilton 1668 and Alexander 1669, four times in Buchan 1681, twice in Burnet 1686, and 
few more times in later theses. Gassendi is almost exclusively cited in natural philosophy, 
which confirms its importance in the curriculum. With respect to Boyle, though, there is 
neither an identifiable pattern nor overall impact of Gassendi on the theses and his citations 
seem sporadic. By the 1680s his importance declines rapidly right at the time of the 
increasing importance of the English experimentalists.62 
 
Conclusion 
The importance of the English philosophers in the Scottish universities is explained by the 
close relations between England and Scotland and by the high quality of the philosophical 
achievements south of the Tweed. While keeping the English philosophers at arm’s length 
(they are invariably “Anglus”, “Cantabrigensis”), the Scottish regents were keen to learn 
from them. The Scottish universities were part of an intellectual and academic community 
whose identity was increasingly identifiable as British. 
Arguably though, the Scottish regents did not beat the national drum of the English (let 
alone the British) philosophers vis-à-vis the system of the French Descartes. The national 
element is not there in the same way as it was in the calculus controversy between supporters 
of Newton and Leibniz, or in eighteenth-century French Cartesian resistance to 
Newtonianism. The regents did not contribute new experiments: as in Glasgow, 
“experimental philosophy” was rather within the remit of mathematics chairs. The regents did 
not usually have a specific background in mathematics either: the relatively accessible Boyle 
was a philosophus, while the highly technical Newton was a mathematicus. Curriculum 
concerns prevailed. The regents thought as natural philosophers within a coherent structure of 
philosophical disciplines, rather than as experimental philosophers or mathematicians. They 
believed that English experimentalism and empiricism were compatible with Descartes’ 
metaphysics, that they provided a better physics than Descartes’, and that Boyle’s natural 
 
61 Hutton 2015, 61-63 on Gassendi and British philosophy. 
62 Heereboord’s case is less interesting. Citations are limited to very few sets of theses mainly in the 1660s and 
seem even more sporadic than Gassendi’s. The teaching of Pufendorf and Grotius, especially in Gershom 
Carmichael’s theses, appears only at the close of the century. 
Gellera: English Philosophers 
JSP 2015 
17 
 
theology was preferable to the a priori proofs of the Meditations. The regents remained 
Cartesian in the fundamentals of their philosophy, a Cartesianism born out of Reformed 
scholasticism. 
This brings us to a final remark on the relations between seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries in British philosophy. Sarah Hutton has recently reviewed the two main narratives 
as follows: 
On one view Locke is the seventeenth-century philosopher for the Enlightenment, 
the philosophical spokesman of empiricism and representative of the natural law 
tradition, and bringing in his train the natural philosophers Boyle and Newton as 
well as Bacon and Cumberland [...] On Another view it is Shaftesbury who forms 
the bridge between seventeenth-century British philosophy and the 
Enlightenment‒Shaftesbury as anticlerical heir of Hebert of Cherbury, and father 
of eighteenth-century sentimentalism.63 
Elaborating on the remark that “neither view captures the complexities and scope of the 
eighteenth-century philosophy”,64 I would like to suggest a third view. In the early 
eighteenth-century Scotland, the respective tendencies towards Locke and Shaftesbury ‒ just 
like the earlier tendencies towards More and the Experimentalists, and against Hobbes and 
Locke ‒ were received in, and mediated by, the seventeenth-century synthesis of Reformed 
scholasticism and Cartesianism. This synthesis has an important place in the investigations of 
the relations between English and Scottish philosophies in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. In this synthesis one can find the worldview and philosophical interests of the 
generations of Scottish philosophers before the Enlightenment. 
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